Wild fish stocks are rapidly declining due to overfishing. This affects the balance of the marine ecosystem and the social and economic well-being of the coastal communities. Legislation is introduced on a national and international scale to avoid overfishing.

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        We designed a non-cooperative game-theoretical model, where the different fishing areas defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) are the players. Each player tries to optimize their fishing profits, influenced by the fish stock. The fish stock of each player is not only affected by its own fishing behaviour, but also by the behaviour of the player that share currents and fish movement patterns. We designed three variants of the game: (1) each area tries to optimize its profit individually without any restrictions, (2) each area restricts their fishing catch by designing new sustainable policies, and (3) an imitation game in which players mimic behaviour of their successful neighbours.

 

      The results of the different variants can be used to understand the effects of fishing policies and to design fishing legislation aimed at boosting fish populations, helping fishing communities to thrive and making the fishing industry sustainable in the long run.